Earlier in 2026, I reported on the troubles facing the SeAH Wind factory in Middlesbrough as it lost its two major customers. In June, I wrote about the financial storm facing the company.
Putting meat on the bones
Followers of Tees Valley mayor Ben Houchen will know that the SeAH Factory has very much been the “poster child” for the Teesworks and Teesside Freeport projects since it was announced in February 2022. When I last discussed the project, I had to rely on mainly out-of-date information held at Companies House, including the year-end accounts for 31 December 2024. However, on 7 September 2026, the company published its Annual Report and Financial Statements for the year ended 31 December 2025. It’s time to replace the speculation with hard numbers. The reports can be found on SeAH Wind Ltd’s Companies House record,
As I was saying
So, firstly, a recap of events so far in 2026:
- On 12 February, I revealed the shocking news that SeAH had lost its inaugural contract, with Danish company Ørsted, to supply monopiles (steel bases) for the Hornsea 3 wind offshore wind project.
- Two months later, I reported on the loss of SeAH’s second contract, with RWE, for the Vanguard West project.
- I summarised the impact of the contract losses on 2 June, both of which helped to create the financial storm facing SeAH.
The Annual Report
The Annual Report starts with a Strategic Report, which notes that commercial production commenced from July 2025. This is an odd statement to make, because we know that it didn’t. The report notes that “mechanical, electrical and plumbing installation and finishing works were completed during the first half of 2026. Completion approval was subsequently obtained on 1 July 2026.” So, July 2026 rather than July 2025, and better late than never. However, if this is correct, it’s got to be encouraging news for the company. It suggests that it should actually be able to start making monopiles for its Vanguard East contract with RWE by the end of 2026. That’s the only order on the books at the moment, though.
Key Performance Indicators
The report then lists three Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The first KPI is the statement of annual profit/loss. We can forget about profits for now. It’s a loss of £43.6mn in 2025, compared with £13.2mn for 2024. Later on, in the “Notes to the Financial Statements”, we learn that the main two contributors to the 2025 loss were: Admin Expenses of £17.5mn, and Cost of Sales of £21.9mn. But there were ZERO sales in 2025. That’s gotta hurt.
Property, plant and equipment
The second KPI in the Strategic Report is a valuation of property, plant and equipment (PPE). This stood at £1.1bn on 31 December. This was after depreciation charges of approximately £10mn over the past two years.
Cash in hand
The third and final KPI is the amount of cash and cash equivalents on hand. At the end of December 2024 this was £27.6mn By 31 December 2025, it had declined to £11.8mn.
Maxing out
As I reported in June, SeAH Wind has a loan facility of £590mn with Standard Chartered and HSBC banks.
This loan is also known at the “The Export Credit Agency (ECA) Term Facility.” The ECA Term Facility is guaranteed by two parties, as follows: UK Export Finance (UKEF), the UK government’s export credit agency, is a guarantor for £414mn of the facility: K-Sure, the South Korean equivalent of UKEF, is a guarantor for the remainder, £176mn.
SeAH Steel Holdings Corporation (SHHC), the South Korean-based parent of SeAH Wind Ltd. also acts as a loan guarantor. SeAH Wind Ltd has maxed out the ECA Term Facility, with borrowings of £592,157,000,
Director’s Report
The Director’s Report dryly notes that the ECA Term Facility is subject to financial covenants, which are tested as of 30 June and 31 December each year. Though it was not met at the June 2025 and June 2026 test dates, the lenders granted waivers in respect of both of those test dates and no event of default has been declared”.
In plain English
What does this mean in plain English? In the “Notes to the Financial Statements”, we learn that there’s a covenant in place, which requires Seah Wind Ltd to maintain a maximum ratio of net debt to EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Taxation, Depreciation and Amortisation) under the facilities agreement. But the report doesn’t say what the ratio is, and by how much it was breached, And it would have been useful to know what would have happened if the lenders had decided not to grant waivers when the ECA Term Facility breached its covenant. Due to the UKEF loan guarantee, £414mn of UK public funding would be at risk in the event of a default.
But there’s more
The company has additional borrowings that I wasn’t aware of in June. Seah Wind Ltd owes £100mn to KEB Hana, a South Korean commercial bank, and £49.7mn to KEXIM, the Export-Import Bank of Korea. SeAH Wind Ltd’s total borrowings as of 31 December 2025 were £741.9mn. SeAH has discounted the loan values down to £714.8mn, which doesn’t look so bad. This is an acceptable accounting device, adjusting the estimated loan value to take future inflation into account. But the borrowing total will have increased since December due to interest payments. And, whichever way you count it, this is way more than the £669mn that I estimated in June.
Share capital and reserves
When you’ve maxed out the “credit card” the next alternative is to raise capital via rights issues, i.e. persuading existing shareholders to buy more shares. As I reported in June, SeAH Wind Ltd does this a lot. As of December 2025, the company had raised £374mn via this method. Since then, it has gone back to the shareholders a further five times, raising £129mn. The transactions can be seen in the table below.
An understatement
Following these share issues, up to and including the most recent one on 2 July 2026, SeAH’s issued share capital comprises 50,062,230 shares with an aggregate NOMINAL value of £250mn. But nowhere do the accounts state the ACTUAL amount raised, which is almost £593mn. This is a bit disingenuous, in my opinion.
So, how much has this all cost?
SeAH has borrowed £742mn to date, and raised £593mn in share capital. That adds up to £1.335bn. It’s £200mn more than I calculated only three months ago. The project was budgeted at £300mn when it was first announced four years ago. SeAH might make its first sale by the end of 2026. Then, depending on the payment terms, the cash may finally start flowing in at the beginning of 2027. By that stage, the accounts will be awash with even more red ink.
Epilogue: Commuting in the Space Age
At some stage in the far distant future, if we are to believe what we are told, SeAH employees will get to and from work via futuristic autonomous pods. But, for the present, they can’t get to this remote site by public transport or on foot. This is because the footbridge connecting the factory with the wider world has been closed since October 2024, due to its dangerous condition. The bridge also serves Platform 2 of South Bank railway station, so that’s been closed for two years also, despite Ben Houchen’s promise to reopen it by August 2025. In the photo below, taken on 10 September 2026, the footbridge looms over the railway station, with the SeAH Factory in the distance.
Thanks to James Waterson for providing additional research for this article.
