It was always essential that the Brexit Referendum be organised and managed in accordance with best practice. Given the already challenging prospects of winning, as discussed in Part 1, any failure to do so meant taking unnecessary, existential risks with very poor odds.
There are many examples of failed referendums. A recent case (2024) is the Australian Indigenous Voice Referendum, which, from an outsider’s perspective, should have passed with relative ease. The Irish government also had a twin failed referendum in 2024 after a lacklustre campaign.
Referendums demand careful, thoughtful design and be a binary choice between two known outcomes. Although Cameron may be excused for being manoeuvred into holding one – perhaps assuming the Lib Dems would block it – his failure to define what “Leave” actually meant was indefensible. This ambiguity skewed the result toward Leave and all but ensured chaos when the result was announced.
A second vital element of a well-structured referendum is the presence of an empowered body – such as a Referendum Commission – that rigorously ensures both sides provide accurate and complete information, enforces high standards of conduct, upholds spending limits, curbs external interference where possible, and prevents malpractice.
Sufficient time must be allowed to fully air all issues and ensure that both the positive and negative trade-offs are understood. Since Leave was never clearly defined, no amount of time could have resolved all the uncertainties, but four months was undeniably too brief. Many significant issues – especially the consequences for Northern Ireland – were barely discussed.
Defining “Leave” proved impossible, as the various factions within the Leave coalition never agreed on what it meant.
Below is a brief summary of these disparate groups, followed by an examination of the three main flaws in the referendum’s design. Finally, there is a discussion on why such a deeply flawed process was allowed to happen.
The Brexit tribes – a disparate coalition
The Brexit tribes can be split into two general categories: the voting public and the driving groups.
The general public
The nostalgists
Probably the largest group among the general public were the nostalgists, who saw 1970s Britain in halcyon terms, a paradise on earth ruined by joining the EEC. They were cheated in 1975, believing they were mis-sold, as they saw the EEC as a Common Market with no implications for sovereignty or wider political integration. There was a sense that they had won the war but unfairly lost the peace. Support for the EEC was grudgingly given solely on narrow economic grounds.
The right-wing was particularly good at grievance politics and repeatedly claimed that the populace was mis-sold the EEC as the Common Market, and that the 2016 referendum would put right a historic wrong. Dominic Cumming’s “Take Back Control” encapsulated the feeling.
I was a young adult in the 1970s and very interested in politics. My recollection is that 1970s Britain was a country in crisis – grubby with everything falling apart. I have no desire to go back to the 1970s. France and, in particular, West Germany seemed to be miles ahead when I visited. Possibly the best attempt to portray the actual culture shock, if it were possible to return to the 1970s, was “Life on Mars”, the multiple award-winning TV series set in Greater Manchester.
One of the few things that was vastly better in 1975 than in 2016 was the quality of the referendum debate. The wider implications of joining the EEC were discussed in detail. It was absolutely clear that it was not just a Common Market as discussed, for example, in the EU ROPE blog.
Nigel Farage, in particular, hammered home the big lie that the EEC was mis-sold to the British public. Sadly, if a lie is told relentlessly, long enough and often enough, it can become accepted as truth.
Others have identified a group longing for the glory days of the Empire, but in reality, this group was much smaller.
Xenophobes
A group in the general public was fixated on cutting immigration. The Conservatives had long promised to reduce numbers to the tens of thousands and had failed miserably. Leaving the EU, they argued, would restore control of Britain’s borders. Ending Freedom of Movement (FoM) would supposedly cause net immigration to plummet. The right-wing press, in particular the Express and Mail, ran relentless anti immigration headlines. Curbing immigration would apparently miraculously cure all of Britain’s ills.
Protestors
Another large group in the general public was those who simply wanted to register a protest vote, as discussed in detail in Part 1. Many of these, but not all, were classed as “Left Behind” voters at the time. It is deeply sad that these voters would be the ones most affected by Brexit.
Dice throwers
A mixed group. Some were simply bored and wanted a change. “They are all the same” and “Nothing Ever Changes” were frequent refrains. Others in this group were at the bottom of society and thought no change could make matters worse. Why not roll the dice? might we get lucky?
The driving groups
In addition to the general public, there were driving actors with disparate and often contradictory agendas:
- Free Traders viewed the EU as a stagnant protectionist bloc. They believed that, freed from being “shackled to a corpse,” Britain’s exports would soar and its trade deficit would vanish, benefiting from both declining European markets and surging global ones. They imagined German carmakers and Italian Prosecco producers would ensure the UK secured a stellar trade deal. With a flurry of new agreements struck by supposedly world-class British negotiators, Britain would easily outperform the cumbersome EU. If Germany succeeded in trade despite EU “constraints,” that only proved the EU was rigged in Germany’s favour—another reason to leave.
- EU Destroyers. A group that wanted to destroy the EU, hoping for a domino effect after Brexit, who, if not Russian assets, were useful idiots. The tactic was extreme populism, as discussed in my piece Fascism as a Methodology rather than an Ideology.
- Singapore-on-Thames advocates – low tax, light regulation, open to global business – with little interest in reducing immigration.
- Flexiters. A relatively pragmatic group, led by Richard North, promoted “Flexcit” – a slow, carefully planned exit from the EU.
- Leveragers. These never wanted to leave the EU, but viewed the referendum as leverage to extract further concessions from Brussels – hoping to relive the glory days of Margaret Thatcher’s tough negotiating. As the Germans put it: ExtrawurstGroßbritannien.
- Sovereignists. Fixated on sovereignty, they insisted that Brussels imposed most of the UK’s laws – laws they claimed were unfit for Britain. Ironically, when pressed, they could never name a single EU law they actually opposed. For them, sovereignty was a principle, not a practical concern.
- Shadowy Actors – often grouped under the banner of 55 Tufton St – were bankrolled by the American far-right, who also sought to undermine the EU. Donald Trump’s special envoy to Northern Ireland, Mick Mulvaney, made it clear: Trump despised the EU because it could stand up to the US and negotiate far better trade deals than smaller countries. The notion that the UK would be “at the back of the queue” was laughable, especially to “Anglosphere” fantasists.
- Cost Cutters. Another group fixated on the UK’s EU contribution, repeating the refrain: “We pay billions and get nothing in return.” Among them were DUP Unionists, convinced that every penny funding Ireland’s motorway network came from British taxpayers. Few understood that most of the EU budget comes from a modest VAT levy, which means larger economies pay more, or that the UK ranked only 8th in per capita contributions. In reality, the UK’s trade surplus with Ireland exceeded its annual subvention to Northern Ireland, estimated at £450 million per week.
- Atlantasists. This group thought that we should move much closer to the US and that the EU was preventing this relationship. Some dreamed of a larger anglosphere including Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
- Vulture capitalists and currency traders saw Brexit-induced chaos and a weakened UK as a money-making opportunity. Others feared that the EU’s tightening grip on tax evasion would threaten the profitability of havens such as the Cayman Islands and other Crown dependencies.
- The DUP – still gripped by imperial nostalgia and dreams of lost greatness – proved an ideal conduit for covert, unattributed funds flowing into the Leave campaign. Their credulity made them especially vulnerable to even the most brazen lies. Though small in number, their influence was significant.
Attempts were made to define a common Leave position, but given the disparity of opinion, it proved impossible.
Most of the beliefs of the groups above were weapons-grade bullshit, but no matter, they had major emotional appeal to large tranches of the public.
Referendum design and best practice
Three essential elements of a well-structured referendum are binary choices, policing and sufficient time. These are explored in this section.
Referendums should be binary choices between known outcomes
This should be self-evident: at its core, Referendum 101 demands a clear binary choice between known outcomes. Yet the Leave campaign was allowed to sell a fantasy – a “Mirror of Erised” scenario – offering voters millions of imagined futures. Micro-targeted ads from Cambridge Analytica and its law-breaking partner AIQ pushed these illusions even further. This ambiguity provided the Leave campaign with a massive strategic advantage. Had “Leave” been defined, the coalition would have fractured, and Leave would have been far less likely to carry the day.
Did Brexit mean leaving the Customs Union and the Single Market? For some, yes; for others, no. As Theresa May famously said, “Leave means Leave,” and called for a “Red, White and Blue Brexit.” Ambiguity was not an accident – it was central to the Leave strategy.
Set up an independent Referendum Commission
In Ireland, an independent referendum commission ensures the public is fully informed about both potential outcomes – often by publishing draft legislation – serves as an impartial referee, and clarifies contentious issues. Outright lies, like the notorious £350 million for the NHS claim, wouldn’t survive first scrutiny. Opinion is one thing; facts are another. The notion, popularised by Newt Gingrich, that “what people feel about an issue is more important than the actual facts” would be firmly challenged – especially after the hard lessons of the global financial crisis. Unfortunately, the UK seems increasingly willing to embrace “preferred facts.”
Without such a body, the Brexit referendum became a bitter free-for-all, marked by industrial-scale dishonesty and unprecedented levels of cheating.
The last Irish abortion referendum unfolded over two years, beginning with the innovative Citizens’ Assembly – a process dedicated to airing every argument thoroughly. In stark contrast, the Brexit referendum was squeezed into just four months. The Remain campaign, pressed for time, focused almost entirely on economics. Crucial issues – most notably the Irish Border (or, more accurately, the British border in Ireland) – were barely discussed at all.
Allow enough time to air all the arguments and educate the public
Matthew O’Toole (now an SDLP MLA and leader of the opposition in the Northern Ireland Assembly) was Downing Street’s chief press officer for Europe and Economic Affairs in 2016, tried and failed to put Northern Ireland’s fate on the agenda—Cameron brushed it aside, claiming there was no time.
How was such a deeply flawed referendum ever allowed to happen?
The referendum was originally intended as a non-binding, advisory poll – stripped of legal force and, hence, due process and the usual checks and balances were unnecessary.
Yet this glorified opinion poll was abruptly transformed into a binding mandate. Cameron declared he would treat the result as binding, and many MPs followed suit. This was an act of breathtaking recklessness – and arguably, of questionable legality.
In addition to the design concerns outlined above, given the magnitude of leaving the EU, it would have been wise to stipulate a 2/3 (66.66%) supermajority and a majority in each of the UK’s four constituent parts.
Was this just Cameron’s carelessness and hubris – so convinced was he of victory – or something more sinister? That a supposed modern democracy could allow such a referendum was, and remains, outrageous.
More than with the Scottish Independence referendum, it was vital to produce detailed white papers – thousands of pages outlining what post-Brexit Britain would actually look like. Failing to do so was the single most significant strategic blunder, setting the stage for years of chaos.
Motives are often hard to discern. For Leave, this “error” was a triumph; for Remain, it was a catastrophe.
Chancellor George Osborne advised strongly against holding the referendum, but Cameron, notoriously a former Bullingdon Club member, may have thought others could clean up the mess:
“They were careless people, … they smashed up things and creatures and then retreated back into their money or their vast carelessness or whatever it was that kept them together, and let other people clean up the mess they had made.”
F Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby
Cameron’s overconfidence was striking. He reportedly assured Jean-Claude Juncker that he was certain of a 60:40 victory in the referendum. Juncker, unimpressed, replied, “I wouldn’t even be confident of that in Luxembourg.”
Yet despite winning the first Tory majority since 1992, Cameron’s position was more precarious than it appeared. With only a slim majority of 10, he faced threats of defections to UKIP. To keep his party together, he agreed to keep Leave undefined and to hold an early referendum.
Cameron’s commitment to Remain was questionable. He may have viewed the referendum as leverage for extracting further concessions from Brussels – especially on Freedom of Movement – rather than as a cause he genuinely supported.
At the time, there was a strong emphasis on honouring manifesto commitments. But with a fixed-term parliament of five years, Cameron could have delayed the referendum, allowing time for the Leave proposition to be properly defined. Instead, the urge to end the Tory civil war proved irresistible, and an early, ill-defined referendum was called, without the essential safeguards as outlined above.
Conclusion
This so-called “referendum” was a sham – an unnecessary exercise, birthed from internal Tory party infighting rather than genuine democratic need. “Frauderendum” would be a more fitting description. This episode vividly demonstrates why referendums are banned at the federal level in Germany: they are ripe for manipulation by extremists. As discussed in Part 1, it quickly became a tool for the far-right. Britain, meanwhile, sleepwalked into disaster.
With “Leave” left deliberately undefined, the odds were stacked in its favour. The process resembled a game of Russian Roulette – except this time, only one chamber was empty.
The absence of oversight was equally inexcusable. Major constitutional change carried by a slim majority all but guaranteed deep and lasting divisions. The bitterness and trauma echoed the Irish 1983 Abortion Referendum, which divided Ireland for a generation until the decision was reversed 35 years later.
Many clung to the “good chaps” theory of British governance: that decency and fair play would ensure a clean campaign. Surely Cameron, backed by Labour, would devise a winning Remain strategy, and Leave would be exposed as the frauds they so obviously were. After all, could a G7 nation with a venerable democracy and a respected broadcaster really be undone by a gang of law-breaking charlatans?
It couldn’t happen here, could it? Yet it’s always the hope that kills you.
